We present a deterministic Key Predistribution scheme in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) using combinatorial designs. The design finds application where a large number sensor nodes are to be deployed. This scheme has the advantage that each sensor node contains very few keys, however every pair of sensor nodes within communication range can directly communicate with each other. We calculate the resiliency of the network with respect to two parameters of resiliency. Our scheme is resilient to selective node capture attack and node fabrication attack.
Introduction
Sensor nodes are devices with very limited power and memory and are deployed in large numbers over a target region. There are two types of sensor networks. In applications where secure communication in needed (for example in adversarial regions), sensors encrypt messages using cryptographic keys. The keys are either predistributed in the sensor nodes or online key exchange protocols can be used. Online key exchange is not very popular to date as implementation of public key framework demands processing power at the higher end. Very recently implementations of ECC and RSA on 8-bit CPUs have been proposed [13] . Still a closer scrutiny of [12, Table 2 , Section 3. 3] reveals that the algorithms execute in seconds (the range being 0.43s to 83.26s); whereas the key predistribution just involves the calculation of inverse of an integer modulo a prime number [14] , which is bound to be much faster than the former. Hence key predistribution is an attractive option.
Key predistribution techniques can be randomized, deterministic or hybrid. In randomized technique of key predistribution [11, 7] , keys are drawn randomly from a key pool and placed in each sensor node. This technique does not guarantee that any two nodes will be able to communicate directly. If direct communication is not possible, then a path needs to be established between the two nodes. This makes communication slower and power consuming. In deterministic key predistribution, keys are placed in sensor nodes in a predetermined manner. The pioneering work of Camtepe and Yener [3, 4] used projective planes and generalized quadrangles, Lee and Stinson [14, 15] used transversal designs, Chakrabarty, Maitra and Roy [5, 6] used merging blocks constructed from transversal designs. Other works include the use of P BIBD by Ruj and Roy [18] , modified transversal designs by Ruj and Roy [17] , 3 − designs by Dong, Pei and Wang [9] and Costas arrays and Distinct Difference Configuration (DDC) by Blackburn, Etzion, Martin and Paterson [1, 2] and orthogonal arrays [10] . Hybrid designs combine the above two approaches and have been studied in [3, 4, 5] .
Here we consider a deterministic key predistribution scheme based on combinatorial designs. It has the advantage that it can support a network of very large size, at the cost of very few keys in each node. Also by suitably choosing the parameters of the design, it can be ensured that every pair of nodes within communication range can communicate directly, thus making communication efficient and less error-prone. The main advantage of our scheme is that it is resilient to selective node capture attack and node fabrication attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define a few terms and concepts. We also define the threat model. We present our predistribution scheme in Section 3.
We study the effect of node compromise on such a network in Section 4. We conclude with some open problems in Section 5.
Preliminaries

Combinatorial designs
Definition 1 A set system or design [14] is a pair (X, A), where A is a set of subsets of X, called blocks. The elements of X are called varieties. A Balanced Incomplete Block Design (BIBD) BIBD(v, b, r, k, λ), is a design which satisfy the following conditions: 
The dual set system of (X, A) is any set isomorphic to the set system (X , A ) where
and where
It follows that if we take the dual of a BIBD(v, b, r, k, λ), we arrive at a design containing b varieties, v blocks each block containing exactly r varieties and each variety occurring in exactly k blocks. We also note that any two blocks contain λ elements in common. 
Definition 5
The intersection number between any two blocks is the number of elements common to the blocks.
Definition 6 Let the intersection numbers between any the blocks in a BIBD
We note that for a SBIBD, |M | = 1 and µ = λ.
Threat Model
There are different types of models for node capture [16] .
1. Random node capture attack: Nodes are captured randomly.
2. Selective node capture attack: This capture attack is given in [16] . Assume that the attacker's goal is to collect a subset T of the keys in the pool. The attacker has already compromised a number of sensors, and has collected all their keys in a set W . For every sensor s in the WSN, the key information gain G(s) is a random variable equal to the number of keys in the key ring of s which are in T and are not in W . In this paper we show that an attacker does not gain in any way by launching a selective node capture attack. In fact selective node capture is just as good as random node capture from the point of view of the attacker. We show that our scheme is resilient to node fabrication attack.
Design construction
We can map a BIBD(v, b, r, k, λ) design to a sensor network containing v keys in the key-pool. There are b sensor nodes, each node containing k keys are each key occurring in r nodes. Any pair of keys occur in λ blocks.
It can be seen that for a symmetric design any pair two blocks will contain λ elements in common, since µ = λ.
We consider two BIBDs:
be the respective incidence matrices. Therefore the dimension of M 1 and M 2 are v 1 × b 1 and v 2 × b 2 respectively. A requirement for our design is that k 1 = v 2 . This facilitates in the construction of the new matrix from the older ones. We construct the matrix M in the following way. 
Analysis of the linked design
We note that the number of sensor nodes can be increased without increasing the size of the key-pool and the number of keys in each node. This is very important since a DW SN contains a large number of nodes with very limited memory and power. Both these problems can be effectively handled by our design.
Now we have to ensure that no two nodes will have the same set of keys in them. The following example results in two nodes having the same set of keys. The following theorem imposes some restriction on the choices of the parameters of the design so that no two blocks are identical.
be the intersection numbers of any two blocks in D 1 . Let µ = max{µ i : i = 1, 2, · · · , t}. If µ < k 2 then, no two blocks will have the same set of keys in them.
Proof : Refer to the construction in Section 3. By our construction each column gives rise to b 2 columns. The b 2 blocks corresponding to these columns which belong to the same group will be different since the blocks in D 2 are different. So we consider blocks which arise out of two different columns of D 1 . Let B 1 and B 2 be two blocks in D 1 which share µ elements in common. So the matrix M 1 will have µ rows where both the columns B 1 and B 2 will have ones in them. Let these rows be n 1 , n 2 , · · · , n µ . When we construct the matrix M , for each of these k 1 ones of column B 1 and B 2 we substitute a row of M 2 . Let for the µ rows n 1 , n 2 , · · · , n µ we have ones in the same rows in two columns C 1 arising from B 1 and column C 2 arising from B 2 of the matrix M . Since µ < k 2 there are some other rows in the block B 1 which will give a 1 in column C 1 but not in C 2 . Similarly, there are some other rows in the block B 2 which will give a 1 in column C 2 but not in C 1 . Hence the two nodes arising from C 1 and C 2 can never have the same keys. This happens for every pair of columns in the resulting matrix M . Hence none of the blocks in M have the same elements.
Additionally we would like to ensure that any two blocks share at least one key. We give a construction which will always ensure that any two blocks will share at least one key.
. Then it can be seen that any two blocks will have at least one element in common. (127, 127, 126, 126, 125) , then the sensor network will have 32385 sensors each sensor having just 126 keys which is much less than the square root of the number of nodes. The size of the key-pool will be 255 and each pair of nodes shares more than one keys.
The above example are just a few instances to show how we can increase the number of sensor nodes, without adding more keys in the nodes and communicate directly with every node thus saving power and minimizing errors caused due to multiple hops.
We next study the effect of node compromise. We define two parameters for resiliency and and show that our scheme fares better than that of [14] in several respects.
Effect of node compromise
Sensor nodes deployed in an hostile region are prone to node capture or compromise. In such a situation all the keys in the compromised nodes become ineffective and cannot be used for further communication. Hence we need to know how resilient the network is under node compromise. This means that on compromising some nodes only a part of the network will be affected. When nodes are compromised, it may so happen that either some links are broken or a whole node is disconnected. The later happens when all the keys in the node are exposed. We measure the resiliency of a network in terms of two parameters V (s), which is the fraction of nodes disconnected when s nodes are compromised and E(s), which is the fraction of links broken when s nodes are compromised.
We have already seen that there can be three types of attack on the sensor nodes.
Resiliency against selective node capture
During selective node capture attack, the attacker compromises those nodes whose keys have not already been compromised. We note that any two nodes broadcast only their node identifiers during the shared-key discovery phase. The key identifiers are not broadcasted. At no stage the attacker can know what key identifier is present in which node. Hence there is no way of knowing which nodes are left to be compromised. Thus unless the attacker compromises the node, she cannot choose a node for compromise to maximize the number of keys compromised. Hence the attacker does not gain anything by mounting a selective node capture.
Resiliency against node fabrication attack
In node fabrication attack, the attacker compromises a few sensors and fabricates new nodes with new identities or with identities of the uncompromised sensors. In our scheme each node has a distinct identifier and hence it is not possible to assign the same identifier to another node. Also since the nodes know which identifiers are valid, new identifiers cannot be assigned. Hence our scheme is secure against node fabrication attack.
Resiliency against random node compromise
Study of V (s): V (s) is defined as the fraction of nodes disconnected when s nodes are compromised. Mathematically, V (s) = Number of nodes disconnected when s nodes are compromised
where N is the size of the network.
We calculate the minimum number of nodes that must be compromised to disconnect one node. To disconnect one node all the k 2 keys in the node must be compromised. We note that if nodes within the same group are compromised, maximum nodes are affected. This is because, two nodes within the same group intersect at more number of points that two nodes in distinct blocks. When the parameters are
, then any two nodes within the same group share v 2 − 2 keys. Thus if two nodes are compromised within the same block, then one node is disconnected. This node lies in the same block as the compromised nodes.
However if nodes belong to different blocks then more number of nodes have to be compromised to disconnect one node.
The Table 1 gives the experimental result of V (s) when s nodes are compromised.
Study of E(s) To break the entire network, the minimum number of nodes that have to be compromised is v 1 /k 2 . This is because to break the entire system all keys v 1 have to be exposed. Suppose each sensor contributes k 2 keys. Given s nodes are compromised (s < v 1 /k 2 ), number of keys lost is less than sk 2 . Number of links broken is total number of links * sk 2 /v 1 . Hence maximum value of , where s is the number of nodes compromised. The Table 2 
Comparative study
We compare our design with that given in [14] and see that our design performs much better in several respects. Firstly even for a very large network the number of keys per node is very small. If N be the size of the network, then each node contains less than √ N keys. Secondly we can ensure that every pair of nodes within communication range is directly connected. This minimizes the cost, the time and the error in communication. The design given in [14] did not ensure that any two nodes were directly connected. Thirdly we see that our design has better resiliency (E(s)) as observed in Figure 1 below. We compare the following two schemes. We choose approximately the same parameters which are given in Lee and Stinson's [14] scheme.
1. Our scheme having a network of size 2840 where each node has 39 keys per node and the size of the key-pool is 355.
2. The scheme given in [14] having a network of size 2209 where each node has 30 keys and the size of the key-pool is 1740.
Conclusion
In this paper we describe a key predistribution scheme using combinatorial designs. Our scheme can support a very large network still maintaining very few keys in each node. By properly choosing the parameters it can be ensured that any two nodes within communication range can communicate directly. Our scheme is also resilient to selective node capture attack and node fabrication attack.
In future we would like to study the properties of expanded design and chose the combinatorial designs which give best resiliency.
